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COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
BoYcorTING.-[England] A case has at length reached the
House of Lords, which has already created more than the usual
interest during its progress through the court of original juris-
diction and the Court of Appeal. This is Sorrell v. Smith.- A
large number of London retail newspaper agents (we are nowhere
told how large a proportion of the total number) formed a union,
of which the plaintiff was a member. This organization under-
took to prevent the coming of new dealers into territory which
they regarded as already sufficiently supplied. Such dealers having
come into certain territory, the organization called on the whole-
saler, Ritchie, to cease furnishing papers to them. On Ritchie's
refusal to do as asked, the plaintiff, who also bought from Ritchie,
volunteered to aid in bringing pressure to bear, and to this end
transferred his business to another wholesaler, Watson. Ritchie
reported his difficulties to the defendants, a committee of the
circulation managers of the newspapers themselves. The defend-
ants, being opposed to any limitation on the number of retailers,
informed Watson that if he continued to sell papers to the plain-
tiff his entire supply would be cut off, either directly, by their
refusal to sell to him, or indirectly by their refusal to sell to any
other wholesaler who might sell to him. Watson at once sub-
mitted and told the plaintiff that he would not renew his contract
to supply him. The plaintiff asked an injunction restraining the
defendants from interfering with his making such contracts with
Watson as he chose. This was granted in the lower court,2 but
the judgment was reversed in the Court of Appeal.3 The plaintiff's
appeal is here dismissed by the House of Lords, opinions being
read by Lords Cave, Dunedin, Sumner, and Buckmaster.
The law of England on the subject of boycotting has for long
been in great confusion, decisions being hard to reconcile, and
opinions even more so.4 In these circumstances it is no wonder
that the Court of Appeal in deciding this case breathed the fervent
hope that it might finally result in getting from the House of
iLords "a clear expression of the law."r5 This hope will be en-
tirely disappointed, if a universally applicable rule of thumb was
looked for. Although there is unanimity as to the result, it is
reached by two principal channels of reasoning which are only
1. L. R. (1925) A. C. 700.
2. L. R. (1923) 2 Ch. 32.
3. L. R. (1924) 1 Ch. 506.
4. The confusion and the divergent viewpoints are nowhere more strik-
ingly presented than in one of the monographs of the Institute of Com-
parative Law of the University of Lyons by EI-Araby. "La Conscriptiorr
des Neutres dans les Luttes de la Concurrence Economique." This volume
is built up on the opinion rendered by the trial court in the instant case.
The author, as a foreigner, free from any preconceived notions, is particularly
able to distinguish the confused positions taken in prior cases.
5. See Bankes's Opinion, L. R. (1924) 1 Ch. 506 at 514.
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partially in harmony with each other as to their fundamentals and
which display even more divergence as to their details. It demon-
strates once more our good fortune in the practice of our highest
courts of confining themselves to a single opinion. Either Lord
Sumner's or Lord Dunedin's opinion (these are the principal ones),
would have clarified the law if it had stood alone; read together
they tend rather to obfuscate it even more. The bulk of the
latter's efforts is devoted to showing that a combination to do harm
to another, without a proper motive, is actionable, even though the
means used are per se "lawful." It is to be inferred from his
words that both of these elements, combination and bad motive,
must be present, but he stresses the need of showing a combina-
tion, apparently because he believes that this need has not pre-
viously been sufficiently appreciated. Thus he states6 that the
effect of Allen v. Flood7 was to settle that where it was merely
an individual who was acting, his motive was immaterial, he was
on the right side of the law so long as he confined himself to
lawful methods. To Lord Sumner on the other hand the factor
of combination is almost, if not entirely, irrelevant. He agrees
that proof of a combination may strengthen the inference that
intimidation was practiced, but per se the circumstance of there
being a combination seems to be of little interest to him.8 The
presence or absence of evil motive is the touchstone to him, and if
it is present then conceivably he would hold that even an individual
acting alone would be liable.' By thus stressing motive he is not
far removed from the view of Lord Cave, who takes a position half
way between the two already referred to and whose creed is so
brief as to justify quotation:
"(1) A combination of two or more persons wilfully to injure
, man in his trade is unlawful and, if it results in damage to him, is
actionable.
(2) If the real purpose of the combination is not to injure another,
but to forward or defend the trade of those who enter into it, then
no wrong is committed, and no action will lie, although damage to
another ensues." 10
The difficulty with this statement, or rather the vice which
renders it impossible of use as a working rule, is that the two parts
are not in antithesis to each other. Not only is there nothing im-
possible in an act being wilfully meant to injure another and at
the same time meant to further the doer's trade, thus falling into
both categories; but it is highly probable that this is true of most
trade activities. With certain exceptions not here significant, it
is true that one man's success means his competitor's failure. To
6. At p. 724.
7. (1898) A. C. 1.
8. See particularly at p. 741 and 742.
9. Surprisingly enough he makes no reference at all to Allen v. Flood.
Apparently he would hold it to be rightly decided on the ground that no
evil motive for the defendant's acts was shown.
10. At p. 712.
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the successful one the encounter presents itself in terms of his own
benefits; to the loser in terms of his injury. One of them would
therefore assign the transaction to one category, because there
certainly was an intent to injure; the other to the other category
because he was acavancing his own interests. This difficulty would
be a step farther removed therefore, if the distinction were drawn
between those acts which were done merely to injure another, on
the one hand, and those on the other which, while intentionally
causing injury as their immediate consequence, were nevertheless
done because as a- more remote consequence they would gratify the
desires of the doer. Probably this is what Lord, Cave actually
had in mind, as it certainly is what Lord Sumner had. The
difficulty, however, is thereby only rendered a little less obvious.
In a broad sense every act, whatever it may be, is done to gratify
some desire of the doer. The so-called mere infliction of injury,
too, is the means of achieving a desire and of obtaining a pleasure,
viz. the pleasure of satisfied revenge, for example. Thus the two
categories again overlap, and the second necessarily includes all
possible acts. It may, however, be answered that the law, if
saying that acts are justified if done to satisfy a desire, is con-
fining itself to legitimate desires, 'and that it will not recognize so
anti-social a one as the wish to wreak vengeance, for instance.
This opens the door to an entirely new investigation, and for
the first time, it is submitted the inquiry touches the heart of the
matter. What desires are of so little social utility that their
accomplishment will not justify the inflicting of any hurt on an-
other, and what ones are sufficiently valuable or at any rate suffici-
ently approved, to permit theii fulfillment even at some cost to
others? From Lord Cave's creed it would appear that the desire
to further one's trade interests and to succeed in the economic
struggle is such a legitimate desire. But can the question whether
the gratifying of the desire is a useful one and hence outweighs
the hurt inflicted be determined by examining only the nature of
the desire? The extent of the hurt inflicted is just as important
in finding which one weighs more heavily in the.scales. Good and
bad desires are merely relative terms and only acquire significance
when measured against the harm that they may cause to others.
From a social point of view, then, bad desires "may be defined
as those which tend to thwart the desires of others, or, more
exactly, those which thwart more desires than they assist."' 1  It
would follow that the "legitimacy" of a desire can not be determined
without a simultaneous weighing of the hurt inflicted.
It is this weighing of the relative desirability of conflicting
aims which the courts have had to do and will doubtless have to
do more and more frequently. Consciously or unconsciously this
is what they have done, and the attempt to explain their conclu-
sions as being the mere application of fixed and immutable rules
has been no more futile than the attempt to harmonize these cases
11. Bertrand Russell "What I Believe" p. 66.
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without refer.ence to the considerations of practical expediency
that they involved. Indeed, the attempt to explain them in terms
of the rules applicable to malice, conspiracy, threats, and the like
rather seems to be harmful by inducing the belief that just around
the comer is a self-working formula which will solve all future
cases, and by hiding the fact that this is a problem for the applica-
tion, not of rules, but rather of standards. 2 To recognize that
the line is being drawn between due and undue pursuit of one's
desires is at least to clarify the issue, and to say that the courts
are not capable of estimating so complex a social problem is no
answer since that is in any case what they must do and are doing.
It may be that with more cases and a clearer appreciation of what
is being done a few somewhat definite rules can be worked out.
In fact it would seem that it is just such a rule that Lord Cave
has worked out in saying that the desire to forward one's trade
and economic interests is so laudable and useful a one as to justify
and counterbalance any amount of hurt to others. 13  It may be
that this will prove a real beacon to guide the way, and again it
may be that the future will show rather a drift away from such
economic individualism-no one can tell. But at any rate, reading
the opinions with the points just made in mind, the case does un-
mistakably show a new and striking tendency to give less weight
to past cases merely because they are precedents, and an equally
striking appreciation that the task in hand is really to measure the
comparative utility of'two conflicting sets of interests, a measure-
ment in which past cases, involving different conflicts between other
interests can be of only small aid.14
E. W. PUTTKAMMER.
CONFLICT OF LAWS-EQUITY DECREES AFFECTING FOREIGN
PROPERTY-ALLEGED DISTINCTION BETWEEN NEGATIVE AND AF-
FIRMATIVE DEcREES.-[New York] There has been abundant dis-
cussion-almost to the point of satiety-of equity's power or juris-
diction, and of the propriety of exercising such jurisdiction, when
the prayer is for a decree affecting foreign property or commanding
or enjoining acts abroad. Yet it may be worth while to consider
the reasons advanced in -explanation or justification of existing
rules, particularly with reference to the supposed difference, in
these cases, between affirmative and injunctive relief.
12. The meaning with which the word 'standard,' is used, is that ex-
plained by Professor Pound (1919) Reports of American Bar Ass'n 44:445
at 456 ff.
13. It should be remembered that the discussion here is not as to the
methods by which the defendant accomplishes his desire, to the hurt of the
plaintiff. These, of course, may be illegal. It is assumed that they are
legal and that the only question is as to whether the desire is in itself one
which the defendant will be allowed to gratify with impunity, even with
wholly lawful methods.
14. This new orientation is -most noticeable in the opinion of Lord
Dunedin, who says that strict legal definition cannot be relied on here, and
that in reality we can only appeal to "an inner standard of right and wrong"
(p. 717).
